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Abstract: This essay is an evaluation of year one of the Rural Business Development (RBD) 
program for small rice farmers in León, Nicaragua. The RBD program is administered by the 
Millennium Challenge Corporation, and is designed to deliver agricultural extension advice and 
affordable credit in the form of inputs to farm households. This essay estimates the average 
impact of the program on rice yields and revenues utilizing inverse propensity score weighting 
combined with linear regression. In conducting statistical inference, it also accounts for the fact 
that agricultural outcomes are likely correlated over space in a small area such as the one studied 
here. The results suggest that the program had no impact on average, likely due to the presence 
of a severe drought during the 2008 – 2009 rice growing season, but that poorer households may 
have done better than their wealthier counterparts. This does not account for program costs, 
which when factored in would likely make the overall net benefit of the program negative. There 
may very well be long term benefits to exploiting extension advice and better access to credit 
created by the RBD program, and the it appears to have shielded poorer farmers somewhat from 
the impact of the drought. But the results highlight the danger of introducing programs aimed at 
raising productivity and incomes in areas subject to system unanticipated shocks. Incorporating 
risk management techniques or insurance against systemic risk into extension programs may 
improve welfare and encourage broader participation in agricultural productivity programs going 
forward. 1 
 
1  Introduction 
When thinking of interventions designed to combat rural poverty, agricultural extension and 
credit appear to be natural complements. By delivering knowledge to farmers about productivity 
enhancing techniques and the proper use of inputs, extension can increase returns to capital 
invested in agricultural activities or diminish risks associated with agriculture. At the same time, 
including credit as a component of an agricultural extension program can give farmers the 
resources necessary to fully exploit the knowledge gained via extension services, and bring 
households into the market for extension services that otherwise could not afford to participate.   
This essay evaluates year one of the two-year Rural Business Development (RBD) 
program for rice farmers in León, located on the Pacific Coast of Nicaragua. The program 
combines credit in the form of agricultural inputs with agricultural extension services tailored to 
individual farms.  The RBD program is funded jointly by the U.S. and Nicaraguan Governments, 
and is administered by the local office of the Millennium Challenge Corporation (MCC), a 
development agency of the U.S. Government.  
  Estimated impacts indicate that the program had no impact on yields or revenues on 
average, but that farmers with relatively less wealth in productive agricultural assets did better 
than wealthier farmers, likely due to more intensive use of fertilizer and greater access to credit. 
The lack of a positive average impact may largely be due to the drought that occurred in the 
2009-2010 agricultural year in the study area due to an El Niño event. The timing of rice planting 
decisions in León and Chinandega are such that the magnitude of the 2009-2010 El Niño event 
was not known until quite late in the growing season; the vast majority of farmers plant in July, 
which is when the presence of an El Niño event in 2009 was first confirmed, but its magnitude 2 
 
was not known until much later in the growing season (IRI 2009). Such harsh climatic conditions 
would no doubt undermine the potential of any intervention to improve agricultural outcomes.  
Failing to detect a positive impact in a drought year may or may not indicate a lack of 
benefits overall to participation in the RBD program. Deciding to join an extension program that 
also offers credit may require weighing a tradeoff between higher expected returns and greater 
risk. Farmers might elect to participate in the RBD program because of gains from participation 
that occur over time in years characterized by favorable production conditions, while output in 
years with poor conditions for rice production could be unaffected or even decrease due to 
enrolling in the program.  
In the case of the RBD program, the skills learned via extension agents could be applied 
in future years in which conditions are more suitable for rice. Thus the complete stream of 
benefits due to the program cannot be captured in a static framework. However, the negative 
aspects of poor outcomes among participants also have dynamic implications. At one extreme, a 
long-term deepening of poverty may occur if households sell off assets to meet debt obligations 
(Carter and Barrett 2006). Whether this outcome could obtain depends on how well insured 
households are against shocks, a question the data are not well suited to answer, although as 
mentioned earlier poorer households did better on average than richer farmers, suggesting that 
the program did serve as something of a buffer. In any case, extension and technology adoption 
programs in areas subject to largely unanticipated systemic shocks might be improved by 
measuring the extent to which households can absorb these shocks, and possibly by including an 
insurance component to the package of benefits offered to participants or tailoring extension 
advice to include risk management techniques where possible.   3 
 
In what follows, Section 2 briefly summarizes past literature on the impacts of 
agricultural extension and rural credit. Section 3 describes the study area of León and 
Chinandega and the characteristics of the RBD program. Section 4 describes the goals of the 
evaluation, and Section 5 describes the estimation strategy employed. Section 6 reports 
estimation results and Section 7 subjects these results to robustness checks; Section 9 concludes. 
2  Background and motivation 
This paper adds to the literature on agricultural extension and credit interventions in developing 
country agriculture. Much has been written about agricultural extension in developing countries, 
and earlier work in this area in the context of developing economies is surveyed by Anderson 
and Feder (2004). When econometric methods have been employed, much of this literature 
reports high returns to investments in extension services, e.g., Bindlish and Evenson (1997). But 
as noted by Anderson and Feder, data quality and issues of econometric methodology give 
reason to doubt some of these results. As shown by Gautam and Anderson (1999), small changes 
to model specifications can drastically reduce high estimated returns to extension investments.  
Later studies have made improvements to econometric methodology, and several of these 
are summarized in Cerdán-Infantes, Maffioli, and Ubfal (2008). Studies such as those by 
Praneetvatakul and Waibel (2007) and Godtland et al. (2004) tend to find that extension services 
have had success with respect to knowledge transfer but mixed effects on productivity and 
income. Overall, the evidence for the benefits of extension to agriculture in developing countries 
is mixed, and this conclusion extends to the various modalities by which extension services can 
be delivered (Anderson and Feder 2007). 
  Rural credit markets are the subject of their own rich literature, but only a small portion 
of research has been aimed at measuring the effects of credit on agricultural productivity and 4 
 
incomes. Existing studies generally find positive effects of credit receipt and access on 
agricultural productivity and incomes, but magnitudes vary considerably. Carter (1989) finds 
weak evidence of a positive relationship between receipt of credit and farm income and 
productivity in Nicaragua. Feder et al. (1990) and Foltz (2004) find modest effects of relaxing 
credit constraints on households on output and incomes, the former in the case of rural China and 
the latter using a sample of Tunisian farms. Guirkinger and Boucher (2008) use a broader 
definition of credit rationing than that employed by Feder et al. and Foltz, expanding the group 
of rationed households to include those that exit the credit market due to transaction costs or 
unwillingness to bear the risk of losing collateral in case of default. They estimate much larger 
impacts of eliminating credit constraints on farmers in rural Peru equal to an increase of 26 
percent in the value of output per hectare.  
As summarized by Del Carpio and Maredia (2009), there are a relatively small number of 
rigorous impact evaluations of agricultural extension and rural credit market projects in the 
literature. Their survey of the literature from 2000 to early 2009 identified 20 studies of 
agricultural extension projects and 10 addressing rural credit interventions that satisfied a few 
basic criteria for categorization as a rigorous impact evaluation.
1 When the scope of these studies 
is limited to evaluations of projects that combine extension services with credit, the number 
becomes smaller still. One recent example is Ashfar, Giné, and Karlan (2009), who evaluate the 
impact of DrumNet in Kenya, a program designed to increase participation of horticulturalists in 
export markets. The authors of that study randomly assign groups of farmers to treatments 
including extension services, extension with a joint liability loan, and no treatment. They find 
significant impacts of both versions of the program on production of export crops, formal 
                                                 
1 Basic criteria for inclusion were 1) A focus on agriculture, 2) A defined agricultural intervention, 3) A clearly 
stated counterfactual (e.g., cannot measure impact simply by using a before and after comparison on a single group). 5 
 
financial market participation, and significant increases in income among first time growers of 
export crops.  
This essay does not have the benefit of randomized assignment to treatment. Instead, the 
identification strategy employed is to assume that selection into the program is based on 
observable characteristics, and program effects are estimated using inverse propensity score 
weighting combined with linear regression (Wooldridge, Inverse Probability Weighted 
Estimation for General Missing Data Problems 2007). The soundness of this assumption is tested 
to the extent possible using available data, and results suggest that while there are unobserved 
factors affecting program participation as well as yields and revenue, there is no reason to alter 
the conclusion of no program impacts. 
 The unique features of this paper are the conditions under which the RBD program was 
rolled out, and the use of spatial methods in conducting statistical inference. By evaluating the 
RBD program in the context of a severe and unexpected climatic shock, the results of the 
analysis can serve aid the design of agricultural development programs in areas characterized by 
high production risk from systemic shocks. In conducting inference, standard errors are 
estimated using the spatial autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity robust covariance (spatial 
HAC) matrix of Kelejian and Prucha (2007). A review of the literature uncovered no previously 
published impact evaluations in agricultural development that account for spatial autocorrelation.  6 
 
3  The Rural Business Development program
2 
3.1  The Study Area and the goals and benefits of the RBD program 
León and Chinandega are home to around 830,000 persons, 39 percent of which live in rural 
areas and are involved in agriculture. Nearly all smallholder agriculture is rainfed, with the vast 
majority of irrigated land under the control of large agribusinesses, usually sugarcane or plantain. 
Along with sesame seeds, maize, and sorghum, rice is one of the primary crops planted by small 
farms in the region.  
Rice farmers participating in the RBD program are all members of cooperatives, and 
cooperatives with members in the program receive bundles of inputs for rice production 
sufficient for three manzanas
3 per participating farmer from MCC. These inputs are then leant 
out to participating members; interest rates on these loans vary across cooperatives, as credit 
contract details are controlled by cooperatives rather than MCC. While the input packets are 
meant to spur production in the short term, they are also designed to help each cooperative 
establish a rotating credit fund that will make liquidity available to farmers at in future years. For 
each participating cooperative, MCC pays a maximum of 30 percent of the costs associated with 
the program; the rest is paid for by the cooperative.  
  At the level of the producer, the RBD program for rice farmers also features benefits in 
the form of agricultural extension services, focused on tailoring the use of chemical fertilizers to 
the soil characteristics of each individual farm, more efficient use of agrochemicals meant to 
control threats to the plant, and on better management of the post-harvest stages of production; 
conversations in the field and MCC documentation suggests that particular emphasis was placed 
                                                 
2 This section and the one that follows draw from documentation provided by the Nicaragua office of MCC, and are 
available from the MCC Nicaragua website (http://www.cuentadelmilenio.org.ni) or from the author.  
3 1 manzana = 1.72 acres = 0.70 hectares 7 
 
on the first of these components.
4 The costs of this technical assistance are factored into the 
portion of the total cost of program participation borne by each participating cooperative.  
3.2  Eligibility criteria and participation in the RBD program 
For rice farmers, participation in the RBD consists of several stages, the first of which is 
satisfying eligibility for participation in the program. Eligibility criteria include: 
·  The producer has planted or currently has at least 2 manzanas of rice. 
·  Area of farm must be between 2 and 50 manzanas, non-irrigated. 
·  The main rice parcel must be property of the beneficiary.  
·  The main rice parcel must be outside environmentally sensitive areas. 
·  The beneficiary must be at least 20 years of age. 
As indicated by the eligibility criteria, the program targeted rice farmers with some degree of 
experience with the crop, and also focused on small non-irrigated farms. Forcing farmers to own 
their own land might rule out some of the poorest households in the area, but this restriction 
makes sense in the context of plot-specific extension services if permanent increases in 
productivity are to be achieved. As will be discussed in more detail when describing the data set, 
these criteria were not strictly enforced in the first year, particularly with regards to land tenure 
status. This evaluation focuses on farmers who did satisfy program participation criteria.  
Rice farmers interested in participating in the RBD program submitted requests for 
assistance to their cooperatives. The cooperatives then organized these requests into a single 
business plan that was submitted to the MCC office in Nicaragua for approval. The business 
                                                 
4 From the Plan de Acción de la Estrategia de Salida downloaded from the Nicaraguan MCC office website:  
“Given that the rice plant is highly responsive to the level of fertilization, the focus in terms of productivity growth 
will be based principally on the adoption of Best Agricultural Practices with emphasis on adoption by beneficiaries 
of a program of fertilization personalized and based on the results of soil analysis and the nutritional requirements of 
the plant.” 8 
 
plans themselves are at the cooperative level but are essentially collections of requests made by 
individual farms to participate in the RBD program. Whether or not an individual farmer 
participates in the program depends upon the decision made by MCC with regard to the business 
plan submitted by his or her cooperative.  
4  Outcomes and parameters of interest  
The goal of this evaluation is to estimate the average impact of the RBD program on participants; 
that is, the Average Treatment on the Treated (ATT) for a set of outcome variables. Altering the 
sample to exclude farmers not satisfying program criteria affects the interpretation of the ATT 
estimate in that it will only capture average effects on participants for the population satisfying 
program criteria. In addition, estimated impacts will describe effects on farmers who planted rice 
in 2009, rather than the entire population of farmers who meet program criteria; after trimming 
down the sample, 242 out of 300 farmers remained.
5  
  I focus on two outcomes of interest: yields and revenues from growing rice. While cost 
data are available, they are incomplete and thus insufficient for constructing a measure of profit 
or net revenue. Instead, cost data are used to get a general idea as to whether program 
participants farmed land more intensively than non-participants by checking per hectare 
expenditures on chemical inputs such as fertilizers and pesticides.   
While better measures of welfare exist than yields and revenues, there are good reasons 
for concentrating on these agricultural variables. Firstly, the main goal of the program is to 
address poverty among small rice farmers in León and Chinandega by raising agricultural 
                                                 
5 Four farmers that were not members of eligible cooperatives reported being participants in the RBD program. 
Their names were cross-checked against databases maintained by MCA in Nicaragua, and this could not be verified. 
These households were dropped from the sample used in the analysis, leaving 243 rice planters. The results reported 
are robust to their inclusion, however. In addition, a single non-participant household with extremely high reported 
yields was excluded from the analysis, leaving a working sample of 242.  9 
 
productivity and efficiency. The program is designed to accomplish this by making information, 
credit, and high quality inputs available to farmers, thereby removing the constraints keeping 
them from becoming more commercially successful. If no increase in productivity or revenues is 
observed, and there do not appear to be any efficiency gains among RBD participants, then this 
would suggest that the program had not worked as intended, at least in its first year.  
Another benefit of focusing on yields is that the survey data contain a measure of rice 
yields pre and post-RBD. An implication of the identifying assumptions made in the econometric 
analysis of the RBD program presented here is that one should not detect any impact of the 
treatment on outcomes that could not have been affected by participation in the RBD program. 
For example, suppose we were to estimate the effect of participation in the RBD program on 
lagged yields. If the model has adequately controlled for differences between treatment and 
control households, we should detect no significant difference in pre-program yields across these 
two groups. If we do find a difference, this would strongly suggest the presence of unobservable 
factors correlated with RBD participation and the outcome of interest being modeled.  
5  Identifying assumptions and estimation technique 
5.1  Inverse propensity score weighting 
The evaluation of programs where participation is not random is complicated by the fact that 
outcomes of interest may be correlated with household characteristics which are also driving the 
participation decision. In this case, merely comparing participants and non-participants will yield 
a biased estimate of the ATT. Here I will attempt to control for confounding factors via the 
Inverse Propensity Score-Weighted Least Squares method (IPS-WLS).  
The ATT is equal to the average outcome among the subsample of participants when 
receiving the treatment, minus the average outcome among this same group in the absence of the 10 
 
program. This first average is observed in the dataset, but the second must be estimated using the 
subsample of non-participant households. In order to do so, the following assumption is made: 
Assumption 1 - Unconfoundedness 
Let
0
i y denote the outcome without participation in the RBD program. Let 1 i d =  represent 
membership in the treatment group and 0 i d = for all non-participant households. Holding 
observed characteristics constant, the untreated potential outcome
0
i y is independent of selection 
into treatment. That is:  
 
0 | i i y d ^ = i x x  (1) 
This is known as the “unconfoundedness” assumption, and in this manifestation it states 
that the untreated potential outcome is independent of participation in the RBD program 
conditional on holding i x fixed, where i x is the vector of observed characteristics (Imbens 2004). 
Note that because we are only estimating the average untreated outcome among participants, we 
need not assume that the treated potential outcome, denoted
1, i y is independent of treatment.  
  As shown by Rosenbaum and Rubin (1983), (1) can be restated as follows: 
  ( )
0 | i i y d p ^ x   (2) 
where ( ) ( ) 1| i p P d = = = i x x x is the propensity score, or the probability of participating in the 
RBD program given the observed values of thexvector. In other words, if unconfoundedness 
holds, we can recover unbiased estimates of program impacts by conditioning on the scalar 
propensity score rather than the entire vector of observed characteristics. 11 
 
  In order to condition on the propensity score, an additional assumption must be made: 
Assumption 2 - Overlap 
  ( ) 0 1 for all  . p < < x x   (3) 
This is the overlap assumption, and it insures that there are treatment and control households at 
all values ofxin the support of observable characteristics. 
If there are no unobserved factors correlated with both the outcome of interest and 
selection into the RBD program, then it is only the distribution of observed characteristics along 
with treatment status that determines the average outcome in any given group. This suggests that 
we could recover an unbiased estimate of the average outcome without treatment among the 
group of participating households by applying weights to the subsample of control households. If 
the weights adjust the distribution of observed characteristics in the control group to reflect that 
of the treatment group, then the weighted average outcome among control group households 
would be an unbiased estimate of the average untreated outcome among households participating 
in the RBD program. This is the intuition behind using weights that are based on the probability 
of being in the treatment group given observed characteristics, i.e., weights based on the 
propensity score. 
More formally, suppose we construct weights for households that did not participate in 
the RBD program that are equal to: 






  (4) 12 
 
We then take the weighted expectation of the outcome i y among untreated households, multiplied 
by( ) 1 i d - , holding the xvector constant: 
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  (5) 
The second line is due to holding the x vector constant, and the third line comes from the fact 
that for control households the product of the observed outcome i y and ( ) 1 i d - is equal to the 
product of the potential outcome
0
i y and( ) 1 i d - . The fourth line stems from the fact that the 
propensity score is equal to the expected value of i d holding the xi vector constant. The final term 
follows from unconfoundedness, i.e., the average untreated outcome conditional on x ought to be 
equal regardless of the decision to select into treatment. By the law of iterated expectations, 
taking the expected value of this last term over the distribution of x yields the average untreated 
outcome among participating households in the absence of the RBD program,
0 | 1
i i E y d   =   .  
 Equation (5) can be estimated using the observed outcomes among the control 
households, and an estimate of the propensity score. Suppose the population-level model for the 
decision to enroll in the RBD program follows a logit specification. Then we can write down the 
propensity score as: 13 
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Plugging the logit equation into the equation for the weights given in (4) yields: 
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  (7) 
Once the parameters of (6) are estimated, the fitted values  ( ) ˆ p x are used to construct the 
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This is the difference in two sample averages. The first term is the average outcome among the 
treated households in the sample, and the second is the sample version of the term in brackets in 
the first line of (5). The difference given in (8) will be a consistent estimator of the ATT if the 
model for the propensity score is correct and a law of large numbers can be applied to the two 
averages that appear in the formula.  
5.2  Weighted linear regression 
Inverse propensity score weighting only yields consistent estimates of program impacts if we 
have the correct model for the propensity score. We may be more confident in our ability to 
construct a correct regression model for the conditional expectation of a given outcome of 
interest than in our ability to model the selection process. It turns out that inverse propensity 
score weighting and regression can be combined in a manner that yields an unbiased and 
consistent estimate of the ATT, as long as either the model for the propensity score or the 14 
 
regression model of the conditional expectation of the outcome is correct; this is the “double 
robustness” property of inverse propensity score weighted least squares (IPS-WLS) estimation 
(Wooldridge 2007).  
Consider the following regression model for the conditional expectation of the outcome 
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  (9) 
The first line of (9) specifies the conditional expectation of yields for the group of RBD 
participants in the absence of the RBD program, and the second line is the conditional 
expectation of yields for this same group when its members actually participate. Here it is 
assumed that the i x vector that appears in (9) is identical to that of (6), although this need not be 
the case. The vector contains the means of the i x variables within the population of participants. 
The parameter vector 2 α is the derivative of the conditional mean of the outcome with respect to 
the i x vector, and it captures how the conditional expectation changes in the absence of treatment 
as i x moves away from its mean. The vector ¢ 2 α captures this same effect when treatment is 
received; any difference between ¢ 2 α and 2 α can be attributed to interaction effects between the 
treatment and observed characteristics. 
By the law of iterated expectations, taking the expectation of the first line of (9) over the 
distribution ofxgives the expected value of i y for the group of participants when not enrolled in 
the RBD program, while the expected value of the outcome for the group of participants when 15 
 
the treatment is received can be derived similarly using the second line. The difference between 
these two expectations is the ATT, 1 a .  
5.3  The double robustness property of inverse propensity score weighted least squares 
regression 
Given the assumption of unconfoundedness,
0 0 | 1, | 0,
i i i i E y d E y d     = = =     x x , and the first line 
of (9) can be replaced with an equivalent expression that uses the population of non-participant 
households. This makes it possible to combine the two lines of (9) as: 
  [ ] ( ) 0 1 | i i i E y d d a a ¢ ¢ ¢ = + + + i 2 i 3 x x α x -  α   (10) 
The ATT is still given by 1 a . The vector 2 α is interpreted as before, and the sum of  2 α and
3 α is equal to ¢ 2 α in (9). If the conditional expectation of i y is indeed equal to (10), then the 
ordinary least squares estimate 1 ˆ a will be consistent for the ATT. Furthermore, we can apply 
weights to the data and estimate the parameters of  (10) via weighted least squares. The 
consistency of 1 ˆ a will be unaffected when the regression model is the correct one for the 
conditional expectation (Greene 2003, 226). 
If the conditional mean is not linear, but we have the correct model for the propensity 
score, 1 ˆ a will still be a consistent estimate of the ATT if it is estimated via weighted least squares, 
where the weights for non-participant households are given by (4) and the true propensity score 
is replaced by its estimate. To see why, assume without loss of generality that there is only a 
single covariate, x. The weighted least squares formula for the intercept among treated 





















  (11) 
The interaction between i d and i x X - has dropped out because the latter is evaluated at i x X =
when solving for the intercept, where X is the average of x among RBD participants. The 
probability limit of the first term of (11) is the expected value of the treated outcome among 
households enrolled in the RBD program. The second term converges in probability to the 
probability limit of 2 ˆ a times: 
  [ ] [ ] ( ) | i i i i E xd E xE d x x E xp x     = = =       (12) 
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Assuming that ( ) ( ) ˆ p x p x = , the probability limit of the first term is the expected value of the 
untreated outcome among households enrolled in the RBD program. The probability limit of the 
second term is equal to the probability limit of 2 ˆ a multiplied by: 
  ( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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  (14) 17 
 
The second terms on the right hand side of each intercept formula are asymptotically equivalent. 
Taking the difference between the probability limits of the two intercepts therefore causes the 
second term to drop out of each, leaving: 
    1 0
1 | 1 | 1 ATT
p





i y are the potential outcomes with and without treatment, respectively.  
5.4  Estimation and inference 
Estimating the parameters of the regression model using the IPS-WLS technique is 
straightforward. First, the logit model is estimated via maximum likelihood, and the fitted values 
of the propensity score are used to construct the weights for non-participant households. Next, 
the parameters of the regression model, including the ATT, are estimated by minimizing the 
weighted sum of squared residuals. Define w as the x vector augmented to include the number 
one, and z as the x vector expanded to include one, the treatment indicator i d , and the de-meaned 
covariates used in the regression model. Using this more compact notation, the objective 
function for the logit model can be written as: 
  ( )
( ) ( ) ( ) 1
ˆ exp 1 1
ln 1 ln












w π w π
  (16) 
Minimizing (16) with respect to ˆ πyields the estimated weights. The estimated regression 
coefficients are found by minimizing: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
1
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The first term in brackets in (17) follows from the fact that the weights for non-participant 
households simplify to ( ) ˆ exp ¢ i w π . The estimated ATT is the value of 1 ˆ a that results from 
minimizing equation (17). 
How to conduct statistical inference on ˆ αis less obvious, for two reasons. Firstly, the 
variance of ˆ αwill depend on the parameters of the estimated propensity score, ˆ, π if the regression 
model is not correct; Wooldridge (2002) gives a more general condition that must be satisfied for 
this dependence to be absent. For the estimated variance to be robust to misspecification of the 
regression model, it must account for this dependency. Secondly, this particular evaluation is 
concentrated on agricultural outcomes over a relatively small geographic area. There is good 
reason to believe that unobserved characteristics such as climate and soil quality will be 
correlated over space, causing spatial autocorrelation in the error term of the regression model.  
Kelejian and Prucha (2007) offer a way forward. An analogy between their method and 
the Newey-West method of computing robust standard errors for time series data is useful. The 
Newey-West formula assumes that dependence between observations is a decreasing function of 
distance on the timeline, and selects a maximum length of time beyond which two observations 
are assumed to be uncorrelated. The variance of each regression coefficient is then estimated as a 
weighted sum of the sample variances and covariances of the residuals from the regression 
model about which inference is being conducted, multiplied by the appropriate explanatory 
variables; under the assumptions described above, taking the square root of the terms yielded by 
this procedure generates consistent estimates of the standard error for each regression coefficient.  
The Kelejian and Prucha method works in much the same way, while accounting for the 
peculiarities of spatial data (e.g., at least two dimensions). The authors assume that dependence 19 
 
between observations is a decreasing function of the physical space between them, and that 
beyond a certain distance the dependence is zero. The variance of each coefficient is estimated 
using the weighted sum of sample variances and covariances, where the weights are given by a 
kernel function using the Euclidean distance between observations as the argument and the 
cutoff distance as the bandwidth. Additional details of the spatial covariance matrix and 
inference procedures used in the following section are presented in the appendix.    
6  Results 
6.1  Data 
The sample was drawn from lists of rice producers provided by farmer cooperatives participating 
in the RBD program. These lists were pooled into a single database of farmers belonging to the 
11 cooperatives originally chosen to participate in the RBD program and thought to satisfy the 
criteria listed in above in section 3.2 for program participation. Of these 11 cooperatives, one 
was eliminated because it had dropped out of the program partway through the agricultural year, 
and two others were eliminated because no names of non-participant farmers were made 
available. The remaining eight cooperatives served as the basis of the sample.  
During the process of data collection, a large number of farmers were replaced in the 
sample at the request of MCC due to not satisfying program eligibility criteria; the program was 
to last for two years, but farmers found to violate program criteria would be disqualified in their 
first year of participation. MCC wanted to maintain the option of conducting a second round of 
data collection, and in order to avoid high rates of attrition in was decided that farmers not 
meeting program criteria would be dropped from the sample. Nearly 50 percent of the original 
sample had to be replaced, with the most common cause being failure to satisfy program criteria 
with respect to land tenure status, followed by households being listed more than once on the 20 
 
roster provided by MCC. To round out the sample, a small number of farmers not belonging to 
cooperatives but satisfying other program criteria were surveyed; enumerators located a number 
of such farmers in the field, and a random subsample of this group was chosen to be interviewed.  
The data were collected in a single household visit shortly after the post-harvest stage of 
the agricultural calendar, allowing sufficient time for farmers to have marketed their production 
of rice. The danger of using data collected after the intervention is that we will hold variables 
constant that were affected by the treatment and are correlated with outcomes of interest; this 
would eliminate a portion of the impact from the estimated effect, and potentially introduce other 
sources of bias (Rosenbaum 1984). Recall questions were asked about purchases and sales of 
consumer durables, agricultural implements, and land in order to reconstruct the wealth of each 
household prior to implementation of the RBD program. These are major sources of wealth and 
it seems reasonable to expect households to remember substantial changes in asset holdings over 
a one year period.  
These data were used to construct indices of agricultural and non-agricultural wealth via 
Principal Components Analysis (PCA). The indices explain 26.23 percent and 30.25 percent of 
variation in agricultural and non-agricultural wealth in the sample, respectively.
6 For data on the 
agricultural year immediately prior to the RBD program, households were asked about loans 
taken out for agricultural activities, changes in household membership and demographics, sown 
area of marketed crops, and rice production. Other potential explanatory variables, such as non-
agricultural and unearned income, geographic location, sown rice area suffering plausibly 
exogenous production shocks (drought, flooding, excessive rain), and expectations regarding rice 
                                                 
6 PCA maps variables into a series of orthogonal components explaining successively smaller shares of the total 
variation of whatever is being indexed. Härdle (2007) offers a more detailed explanation of PCA with examples of 
applications. 21 
 
production levels enter into the different models at their reported levels for the 2009-2010 
agricultural year. 
6.2  Results of propensity score estimation and construction of weights 
The propensity score and weights were estimated using a logit model that was linear in its 
arguments. Figure 1 below shows the overlap of the estimated propensity score and a histogram 
of the estimated weights.  
 
Figure 1 
The degree of overlap in the propensity score distributions for the two groups gives us an idea of 
how similar treatment and control households are with respect to observable traits. A linear 
regression model estimated using one particular group can give a good approximation to the 
conditional mean in another group if the two groups have similar characteristics; otherwise, if 
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particular case, the degree of overlap appears to be strong. In addition, we might be concerned 
about outliers in the distribution of the estimated weight, as observations with particularly large 
weights will strongly influence the estimate of the average untreated outcome among participant 
households. In the right panel of Figure 1, there are a small number of outliers to the right of 10. 
However, deleting these observations negatively affects the degree of overlap for the estimated 
propensity score, as all mass to the right of 0.8 in the left panel of Figure 1 disappears for the 
control households.  
Alternatively, we could trim high values from both propensity score distributions, 
removing outliers and preserving covariate balance. Doing so results in a large loss of sample 
size, moving the sample from 242 to 204, and results in less success with respect to removing 
significant differences in covariate means across the two groups by way of inverse propensity 
score weighting. Instead, I opt to not trim the propensity score distributions for the model 
specifications that generate the main results of the paper, but I check the sensitivity of results to 
removal of propensity score outliers. Table 1 below presents the means of the outcomes and 
explanatory variables for the subsamples of participants and non-participants, as well as the 
weighted and unweighted differences across the two groups.  
   23 
 
Table 1: Covariate Balance 




Variable name  Participants  Non-
participants 
   
Rice yields (QQ/mz), 2009  46.982  51.247  -4.265  -0.742 
[2.321]  [2.624]  [3.513]  [5.349] 
Rice revenue per mz. (Córdobas)  13,569.61  13,403.80  165.803  1295.777 
[904.087]  [1,015.512]  [1,359.646]  [1,686.40] 
Altitude  107.822  150.009  -42.187  10.08 
[7.606]  [8.543]       [11.439]***  [13.745] 
Distance from city center  55.709  43.598  12.11  -0.287 
[2.387]  [2.681]       [3.589]***  [5.896] 
Years of education, household head  5.104  4.243  0.861  -0.603 
[0.381]  [0.428]  [0.574]  [6.021] 
Rice experience    6.593  7.028  -0.435  -0.748 
[0.290]  [0.326]  [0.436]  [1.702] 
Gender of household head (Female = 
1) 
0.081  0.103  -0.021  0.027 
[0.025]  [0.028]  [0.037]  [0.032] 
Number of adults  3.178  2.944  0.234  -0.013 
[0.120]  [0.135]  [0.180]  [0.239] 
Number of dependents  1.852  1.86  -0.008  -0.127 
[0.117]  [0.131]  [0.176]  [0.233] 
Proportion of sown area hit by shocks  0.77  0.63  0.141  -0.024 
[0.037]  [0.035]  [0.056]*  [0.066] 
Expected yield in a bad year  38.896  36.935  1.962  0.799 
[1.442]  [1.620]  [2.169]  [2.468] 
Expected yield in a normal year  66.37  61.607  4.763  -0.279 
[1.290]  [1.449]      [1.939]**  [1.857] 
Index of agricultural wealth  0.038  0.275  -0.238  -0.404 
[0.170]  [0.191]  [0.256]  [0.474] 
Index of non-agricultural wealth  0.286  0.064  0.222  -0.379 
[0.192]  [0.215]  [0.288]  [0.885] 
Feel secure about tenure rights = 1  0.941  0.907  0.034  0.001 
[0.023]  [0.025]  [0.034]  [0.033] 
Loan coop. in 2008 = 1  0.259  0.065  0.194  -0.044 
[0.032]  [0.036]       [0.048]***  [0.125] 
Loan formal fin. inst. in 2008  = 1  0.467  0.477  -0.01  -0.012 
[0.043]  [0.048]  [0.065]  [0.104] 
Loan other inst. in 2008 = 1  0.148  0.112  0.036  0.047 
[0.029]  [0.033]  [0.044]  [0.048] 
Observations:  242  242  242  242 
Standard errors in brackets, Significant at *10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 24 
 
For “Rice yields” and “Rice revenue per mz.,” the weighted differences are estimates of 
the ATT corresponding to equation (8); the impact on the former has a negative coefficient while 
the latter is positive, but neither is statistically significant. The remaining variables serve as the 
explanatory factors in the models that follow. Altitude above sea level, distance in kilometers 
from the center of León, subjective expectation of rice yields in a “normal” year, and the 
proportion of farmers receiving a loan from a farmer’s cooperative all show significant raw 
differences, but these differences are all insignificant after weighting. Propensity score weighting 
has done a good job of correcting for observable differences between the two groups.  
6.3  Impact on rice yields 
Table 2 presents results from estimation of the IPS-WLS model for rice yields in quintals
7 for 
2009. Coefficients generated by estimating the model on the full sample are presented in the first 
column. The remaining columns report t-statistics and differ by the specification used for the 
covariance matrix for the parameters of the yields model. The columns headed by “Huber-White 
Robust Standard Errors” conducts inference using the robust standard errors developed 
independently by Huber (1967) and White (1980) that are commonly reported in regression 
output, e.g., by using the “robust” option in Stata. The columns under “Kelejian and Prucha 
Spatial Autocorrelation-Heteroscedasticity Robust Standard Errors” attempt to account for 
spatial autocorrelation while maintaining robustness to heteroscedasticity. This estimator 
requires selection of a bandwidth beyond which it is assumed that observations are uncorrelated. 
Here results are presented for three different bandwidth sizes that allow for correlation between 
an observation and its one, five, or ten nearest neighbors. 
   
                                                 
7 A quintal is around 100 pounds and is preferred unit of measure for rice production in Nicaragua. 25 
 
Table 2: ATT of RBD participation on Rice Yields in Quintals 
Dependent variable: Rice yields (Quintals/mz), 2009  Huber-White 
Robust Standard 
Errors 
Kelejian and Prucha Spatial Autocorrelation-







Explanatory variable  Est. 
coefficient 
t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat 
Intercept  -1.11  -0.07  -0.07  -0.07  -0.06 
ATT (coefficient on d)  -3.71  -1.68  -1.69  -1.69  -1.82 
Altitude (m)  0.05  1.73  1.75*  1.52  1.33 
Distance from city center (km)  0.13  1.53*  1.54*  1.42*  1.27 
Years of education, household head  0.04  0.08  0.08  0.08  0.08 
Rice experience  1.24  1.75  1.76  1.85  1.79 
Gender of household head (Female =1)  3.08  0.66  0.66  0.75  0.81 
Number of adults  -0.48  -0.47  -0.48  -0.45  -0.44 
Number of dependents  0.73  0.40  0.41  0.42-  0.43 
Prop. area hit by shocks  -27.97  -5.23***  -5.28***  5.37***  -4.92*** 
Expected yield in a bad year  0.69  2.98**  2.98**  2.89*  3.12** 
Expected yield in a normal year  0.35  1.40  1.40  1.41  1.47 
Index of agricultural wealth  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02  0.02 
Index of non-agricultural wealth  -0.73  -0.60  -0.60  -0.66  -0.67 
Feel secure about tenure rights = 1  1.32  0.19  0.19  0.20  0.20 
Loan coop. in 2008 = 1  0.93  0.24  0.24  0.27  0.38 
Loan formal fin. inst. in 2008 = 1  0.15  0.03  0.03  0.03  0.03 
Loan other inst. in 2008 = 1  3.88  0.82  0.83  0.83  0.86 
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Table 2: ATT of RBD participation on Rice Yields in Quintals continued: Interactions with treatment indicator d 
dXAltitude  0.02  0.49  0.49  0.48  0.46 
dXDistance  -0.11  -1.02  -1.02  -1.02  -1.05 
dXEducation  0.33  0.50  0.50  0.44  0.41 
dXExperience  -0.51  -0.56  -0.56  -0.57  -0.56 
dXGender  1.35  0.16  0.16  0.16  0.20 
dXAdults  1.18  0.72  0.73  0.72  0.67 
dXDependents  1.18  0.18  0.18  0.19  0.18 
dXShocks  -2.22  -1.01  -1.02  -0.99  -1.00 
dXExp. yields in bad year  -0.11  -0.41  -0.41  -0.37  -0.37 
dXExp. yields in a normal year  -0.10  -0.35  -0.35  -0.34  -0.36 
dXAg. Wealth  -2.91  -2.10*  -2.11  -2.06*  -2.10* 
dXNon-ag wealth  0.45  0.30  0.30  0.34  0.36 
dXTenure security  -7.83  -0.85  -0.85  -0.82  -0.78 
dXCoop. Loan  9.40  1.61  1.61  1.63  1.72 
dXFormal loan  1.57  0.28  0.28  0.28  0.25 
dXOther loan  -5.20  -0.70  -0.71  -0.70  -0.82 
Observations:    242  242  242  242 
Number of bootstrap replications:  996  996  995  991 
* Significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. P-values based on bootstrap distribution of the t-statistic.  
 
Using a linear model to estimate the conditional mean function for yields might be 
problematic, since yields can only take on positive values. However, the fitted values from the 
regression were negative for only two observations, so this does not appear to be a concern. After 
estimating the model and computing t-statistics using the full sample, the distribution of the t-
statistics for the different coefficients were estimated via the bootstrap. Statistical significance 
was determined by the location of the t-statistics computed using the full sample in the 
bootstrapped distributions. This process is known as “asymptotic refinement” and can reduce the 
bias associated with using asymptotic approximations to the distribution of  a test statistic when 27 
 
its limiting distribution does not depend on unknown parameters, such as is the case with the t-
statistic (Cameron and Trivedi 2005, 363-364). Hypothesis testing is done using two-tailed tests 
and not assuming a symmetric distribution of the t-statistic. For example, for a coefficient to be 
significant at the 10 percent level, the t-statistic computed using the full sample would have to be 
less than or equal to the fifth percentile of the bootstrapped t-statistic distribution, or greater than 
or equal to the 95
th percentile.  
The -3.71 point estimate of the ATT represent an 8 percent decrease of average yields for 
treated households, but it is not quite significant at a 10 percent level. Removing outliers with 
respect to the estimated weight yielded estimates that were more negative but less precise, likely 
due to the loss of nearly a quarter of the sample. Significant direct effects include altitude, 
distance from the city center, proportion of sown rice area hit by shocks, and expected yields in a 
bad year. On average, households that are at higher altitudes, more remotely located, and expect 
to have higher yields under poor conditions have higher yields; the first two effects are very 
small in magnitude, as one standard deviation increases in distance and altitude would result in 
yield increases of less than a quintal. The impact of shocks is potent; farmers with the a 
proportion of rice sown area hit by shocks equal to the sample average (around 70 percent) 
would have yields 20 quintals lower than a farmer whose rice parcels were not hit by shocks, 
other things being equal. Lastly, the fact that productivity under poor conditions is important is 
not surprising given the drought of the 2008 – 2009 rice season.  
The interaction terms are estimated imprecisely in general, with the lone significant effect 
being the interaction with the index of agricultural wealth. The program made an effort to 
concentrate on poorer farmers, and this may be what is reflected in the interaction effect. The 
coefficient on the interaction between the RBD program and having received a loan from a 28 
 
cooperative in 2008 is not significant although it is quite large, suggesting that farmers were 
participating in the program were those already identified by cooperatives as productive and 
therefore worthy credit risks.  
6.4  Impact on rice revenue 
Table 3 presents results from estimation of the IPS-WLS model for rice revenues in Nicaraguan 
Córdobas per manzana in 2009.  
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Table 3: ATT of RBD Participation on Rice Revenues in Nicaraguan Córdobas per Manzana 
Dependent variable: Rice revenues 




Kelejian and Prucha Spatial Autocorrelation-







Explanatory variable  Estimated 
coefficient 
t-stat  t-stat  t-stat  t-stat 
Intercept  8,170.89  1.17  1.19  1.08  1.08 
ATT (coefficient on d)  388.40  0.39  0.40  0.35  0.35 
Altitude (m)  22.58  1.70  1.75  1.35  1.35 
Distance from city center 
(km) 
79.04  2.42  2.48  1.95*  1.95* 
Years of education, 
household head 
-182.31  -0.63  -0.63  -0.58  -0.58 
Rice experience  -85.10  -0.32  -0.33  -0.30  -0.30 
Gender of household head 
(Female =1) 
-425.20  -0.19  -0.19  -0.21  -0.21 
Number of adults  355.27  0.55  0.55  0.53  0.53 
Number of dependents  -10,041.40  -1.19  -1.27  -1.19  -1.19 
Prop. area hit by shocks  -577.99  -3.79**  -3.86**  -3.80***  -3.80*** 
Expected yield in a bad 
year 
276.11  3.04**  3.05**  2.97**  2.97** 
Expected yield in a 
normal year 
-52.78  -0.75  -0.76  -0.75  -0.75 
Index of agricultural 
wealth 
540.39  1.05  1.06  1.15  1.15 
Index of non-agricultural 
wealth 
470.75  0.80  0.80  0.89  0.89 
Feel secure about tenure 
rights = 1 
-1,421.9  -0.44  -0.44  -0.46  -0.46 
Loan coop. in 2008 = 1  -267.20  -0.13  -0.13  -0.14  -0.14 
Loan formal fin. inst. in 
2008 = 1 
1,575.99  0.73  0.74  0.79  0.79 
Loan other inst. in 2008 = 
1 
1,300.55  0.63  0.65  0.64  0.64 
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Table 3: ATT of RBD Participation on Rice Revenues in Nicaraguan Córdobas per Manzana continued: Interactions 
with treatment indicator d 
dXAltitude  -1.64  -0.10  -0.10  -0.09  -0.09 
dXDistance  -48.59  -1.18  -1.19  -1.01  -1.01 
dXEducation  352.16  1.02  1.04  0.89  0.89 
dXExperience  440.23  1.31  1.33  1.29  1.29 
dXGender  2,009.60  0.60  0.60  0.61  0.61 
dXAdults  -824.57  -1.05  -1.06  -1.05  -1.05 
dXDependents  -79.84  -0.11  -0.12  -0.11  -0.11 
dXShocks  3,218.43  1.03  1.05  1.03  1.03 
dXExp. yields in bad year  -24.06  -0.24  -0.24  -0.23  -0.23 
dXExp. yields in a normal 
year 
77.45  0.88  0.90  0.98  0.98 
dXAg. Wealth  -1,341.32  -2.12  -2.14  -2.47*  -2.47* 
dXNon-ag wealth  -148.48  -0.22  -0.22  -0.22  -0.22 
dXTenure security  720.76  0.15  0.15  0.15  0.15 
dXCoop. Loan  3,553.36  1.26  1.27  1.37  1.37 
dXFormal loan  -240.60  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10  -0.10 
dXOther loan  -2,381.09  -0.85  -0.87  -0.88  -0.88 
Observations:    242  242  242  242 
Number of bootstrap replications
8:  996  996  995  991 
* Significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. P-values based on bootstrap distribution of the t-statistic.  
 
To put these coefficients in context, around 20 Nicaraguan Córdobas is equal to 1 US dollar, and 
the sample average level of revenue per manzana is 13,496. The estimated ATT is positive but 
not significantly different from zero in all specifications. Pairing this with the non-regression 
adjusted estimated ATT from Table 1 leads to the conclusion that the RBD program had no 
impact on revenue per hectare on average. The direct effects of distance from León, proportion 
of area hit by shocks, and expected yields in a bad year are significant as they were in the model 
                                                 
8 For all models 999 bootstrap replications were used. The actual number of replications is sometimes less than this 
because of problems estimating the covariance matrix of the model parameters; specifically, the routine sometimes 
failed because the matrix was not positive definite. In general, the number of failures was very small.  31 
 
of yields and have the same signs. Most of the average marginal effects are small, but the impact 
of shocks is once again potent; moving from no area hit by shocks to the sample average reduces 
revenue per manzana by over 7,000 Córdobas.  
Examining the interactions effects, there is once again evidence that the program 
successfully targeted poorer farmers, as the average marginal effect of an increase in the 
agricultural wealth index given by the sum of the coefficient on the direct effect and the 
interaction is equal to a decrease of 471 Córdobas for participants, which is 3.5 percent of the 
sample average for revenue; the effect is positive for non-participants. There is some indication 
that more experienced farmers and those receiving loans from cooperatives in 2008 benefited 
more on average in terms of revenue as well. Overall, the results suggest that the program had no 
effect on average on either yields or revenue per manzana, but that the program targeted poorer 
farmers with some success.  
7  Robustness checks 
This section presents a series of robustness checks on the model presented above. While at their 
heart all of these tests are meant to look for signs of omitted variable bias, they can be loosely 
broken down into three categories: those that check for selection bias, those that verify lack of 
sensitivity to the exclusion or inclusion of certain explanatory variables, and those that look for 
evidence of spillovers from treated to untreated households.  
7.1  Selection effects 
Table 4 below presents results of indirect tests of no selection bias.  32 
 
Table 4: Indirect Tests of No Selection Bias
9 





Yields, 2009  Revenue per 
mz., 2009 
Yields, 2009  Revenue per 
mz., 2009 
Yields, 2009  Revenue per 
mz., 2009 
               





in 2008 and 
2009 
Planted rice 



























All  All 
ATT:  7.51  -5.32  995.77  -3.13  1,831.94  -0.21  1,185.53 
t-statistic:     [2.50]**      [-2.45]**  [0.29]  [-1.30]  [1.42]  [-0.08]  [1.13] 
dXAg. Wealth:  0.18  -2.26  -1,125.17  -3.62  -1,009.00  -2.41  -1,430.14 
t-statistic:  [0.10]   [-1.66]  [-0.62]      [-3.58]***  [-1.50]  [-1.43]  [-1.55] 
Observations:  208  208  208  196  196  181  181 
Bootstrap 
replications: 
975  996  991  994  998  999  999 
*10%, ** 5%, *** 1%.         
 
For each set of results, only the estimated coefficient on program participation and that of the 
interaction between agricultural wealth and the RBD program are reported. Column 1 of Table 4 
uses rice yields in 2008 as the dependent variable and estimates the parameters of the IPS-WLS 
model using the full set of explanatory variables and the subset of farmers who planted rice in 
2008 and 2009. The fact that the coefficient on the RBD program indicator is significant suggests 
that the model may not be adequately controlling for confounding factors. Surprisingly, the 
coefficient is positive, suggesting that participant households tend to be more productive than 
non-participants, at least among those that planted in both years.  
                                                 
9 All of the same specifications for the covariance matrix used in Table 2 and Table 3 were used for the models in 
Table 4, but not all are reported. The specifications reported are those that lead to the most conservative conclusions. 
For example, in column 1 the results of using rice yields in 2008 as the dependent variable are reported. A 
significant coefficient on the treatment indicator d would suggest selection bias, as the program could not have 
affected outcomes before being rolled out. Therefore to be conservative I report results from the covariance matrix 
specification that yielded the most precise results, because this will be more likely to yield a statistically significant 
coefficient. In the case of column 1, this turned out to be the Huber-White covariance formula that does not account 
for spatial autocorrelation; precision was decreasing in the number of nearest neighbors allowed to be correlated 
with one another. 33 
 
What may have occurred is that the RBD program induced a number of less productive 
eligible farmers to plant rice, dragging down the average productivity of the treated group. 
Columns 2 and 3 examine this possibility by re-estimating the ATT of the RBD program on 2009 
rice yields and revenue per manzana using only the subsample of farmers who planted in both 
years. The result does not support the possible selection effect described here, as the impact on 
yields is now significant while becoming more negative.  
  The remaining columns test the sensitivity of results to composition of the control group. 
In columns 4 and 5, ineligibles are dropped from the sample and fixed effects for each farmer’s 
cooperative are added to the logit and weighted regression models. In columns 6 and 7, eligible 
non-participants are dropped from the sample. The change in the magnitude of the ATT for 
yields when moving to Column 6 suggests that there may have been unobserved selection effects 
working within the cooperatives, although there is still no evidence of a positive average impact 
on yields. The point estimate for the ATT on revenue remains positive and becomes more 
precisely estimated when altering the composition of the control group, but remains insignificant. 
The average impact on revenue and yields still appear to be zero. 
  The sign and magnitude of the coefficient for the interaction of the RBD program with 
agricultural wealth is robust to the changes in specification, although it is generally estimated 
with less precision than in the full models for yields and revenue.  The results in Table 4 support 
the notion that the RBD program successfully targeted poor farmers.  
7.2  Changing the set of explanatory variables 
Table 5 checks the sensitivity of the estimated ATT effects to changes in the set of explanatory 
variables.  34 
 
Table 5: Sensitivity to Set of Explanatory Variables 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable:  Yields, 2009  Revenue per mz., 2009 
     
Sample:  All  All 
Explanatory variables:  No expected productivity in 
bad and normal years 
No expected productivity in 
bad and normal years 
     
ATT:  -1.33  460.33 
t-statistic:  [-0.48]  [0.35] 
dXAg. Wealth:  -4.47  -1,787.42 
t-statistic:       [-3.18]**       [-3.96]*** 
Observations:  242  242 
Bootstrap replications:  996  996 
*10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Columns 1 and 2 drop the variables containing self-reported productivity in normal and bad 
years. While the relevant survey questions were meant to capture expectations based on past 
experiences, it is possible that farmers in the RBD program incorporated productivity changes 
due to their participation into their responses. If this is so, holding these variables constant in the 
model may bias the estimated ATT downwards. Again we see that the ATT on yields appears to 
be zero. The interaction effects for agricultural wealth are significant, and continue to remain 
similar in magnitude to the effects estimated using the full model.   
7.3  No spillovers from treated to control 
Table 6 checks for the presence of spillovers by comparing average outcomes among eligible and 
ineligible non-participants. 
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Table 6: Spillovers from Treated to Control 
  (1)  (2) 
Dependent variable:  Yields, 2009  Revenue per mz., 
2009 
     
Sample:  Non-participants  Non-participants 
     
Explanatory variables:  All  All 
     
ATT of being eligible non-participant:  1.09  -2,328.99 
t-statistic:  [0.32]  [-1.17] 
dXAg. Wealth:  0.32  428.18 
t-statistic:  [0.21]  [0.41] 
Observations:  107  107 
Bootstrap replications:  796  757 
*10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Spillovers can occur in the context of agricultural extension services if non-participant farmers 
adopt the practices and technologies taken up by participants as a result of the program. The data 
set does not have information on social networks, but common membership in a farmer’s 
cooperative might serve as a proxy. This assumption is the basis of the results in Table 6. A 
significant difference between members of cooperatives who did not participate in the program 
relative to other non-participants could suggest unobserved differences between the two groups, 
or the presence of externalities. In either case, assuming that these two possibilities do not cancel 
each other out, the results in Table 6 support the notion that there were no spillovers from 
participant to non-participant households. Note that the bootstrap routine used to compute 
standard errors was highly unstable, resulting in a large number of failed replications. But the 
estimated t-statistics would be insignificant by the usual standard as well.  36 
 
8   Seeking an explanation 
8.1  Delivery of program services and farmer input choices 
The above provides solid evidence that while the average impacts on yields and revenues were 
zero, the program was able to reach out to poorer farmers. The model does not survive the 
robustness checks without incident, as using lagged yields as the dependent variable results in a 
significant impact of the program when this should not occur if unconfoundedness holds. But on 
the whole there is no reason to reject the conclusions generated by the estimates presented in 
Table 2 and Table 3 regarding the average impact of the program, i.e., that there were none.  
  This begs the question as to why program impacts were so weak on average. The obvious 
explanation is the impact of the drought in the region; for example, this would dampen the 
beneficial effects of more intensive fertilizer use. But the program may have shaped outcomes in 
other ways. As described in Section 3, the RBD program seeks to improve farmer welfare in 
León through extension advice, as well as by giving farmers credit in the form of inputs. While 
there is no measure of how much information farmers retained from extension agents, we would 
expect to see greater input intensity among program participants relative to non-participants, as 
well as a higher volume of credit used for rice farming. Complete data on input costs are not 
available, but the data do include information on quantity of fertilizer and other chemicals used, 
with prices from local input stores collected by the MCC office in León, as well as post-harvest 
costs (drying, storage, transportation of rice, etc.). They also include information on the total 
volume of loans taken out for agricultural activities, as opposed to just for rice.  
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Table 7: Potential Causes of Muted Program Impacts 

















Revenue per mz. 




           
Sample:  All  All  All  All  All 
Explanatory 
variables: 
All  All  All  All  All 
ATT:  9.93  105.42  -169.46  -9,273.87  422.11 
t-statistic:  [0.87]  [1.18]  [-1.25]  [-0.61]  [0.41] 
Ag. Wealth:  12.80  -29.37  128.87  80,144.34  429.87 
t-statistic:  [1.79]  [-0.52]  [1.43]  [1.79]  [0.99] 
dXAg. Wealth:  -20.80  43.86  -143.80  -78,320.30  -1,218.78 
t-statistic:      [-2.18]**  [0.50]  [-1.36]  [-1.73]      [-2.55]** 
Observations  242  242  242  242  242 
Bootstrap 
replications 
994  996  996  995  996 
* Significant at 10%, ** 5%, *** 1%. 
 
Here the direct effect of agricultural wealth on each outcome is presented as well, to make it 
easier to consider average marginal effects. Table 7 provides no evidence that program farmers 
used inputs any more intensively than their non-program counterparts on average, or that they 
received a higher volume of loans. Of course, it is possible that program benefits came in the 
form of greater efficiency rather than intensity. Column 5 uses revenues net of available cost data 
as the dependent variable; the estimated ATT is positive but insignificant. Since the costs here 
were constructed using prices from input stores, they may well be higher than what was paid by 
participants, given the 30 percent subsidy on the value of inputs received by cooperatives paid by 
MCC. But market prices should reflect the opportunity cost of inputs at least as well as 
subsidized RBD prices, and thus are a better indicator of gains or losses due to the program.  38 
 
The negative and significant coefficient on the RBD program and agricultural wealth 
interaction in Column 5 reinforces earlier conclusions regarding the ability of the program to 
target poor farmers. For RBD participants, a one standard deviation increase in the agricultural 
wealth index decreases revenue net of available costs by around 100 Córdobas per manzana, or 
around 0.7 percent of the average revenue per manzana for the whole sample. For non-
participants this outcome increases by around 54 Córdobas on average, although the latter is not 
significant.  
Furthermore, the sign and significance of the agricultural wealth – RBD program 
interaction in the other columns hints at how this may have occurred. In column 1, the value of 
fertilizer applied per manzana is a decreasing function of agricultural wealth; on average, a one 
standard deviation increase in the agricultural wealth index RBD participant leads for to a 
reduction in fertilizer value per manzana of around one Córdoba, whereas the effect is an 
increase of around 1.62 Córdobas for a non –participant (although the direct is not quite 
significant with a p-value of 0.104). This could the positive and significant interaction between 
agricultural wealth and the RBD program on yields in Table 2. The coefficients on the direct and 
interaction effects of agricultural wealth are estimated too imprecisely in columns 2 and 3 to say 
much about RBD impacts. Column 4 offers somewhat stronger evidence that the program 
effectively addressed disparities in supply of credit to poorer farmers, with the large and positive 
direct effect of higher wealth on total credit received surpassed in absolute value by the negative 
interaction effect; the p-values for the direct effect and the interaction are 0.127 and 0.125, 
respectively.  
These cost data are not complete, and the story might change if other inputs and labor 
were included. In any case, households with fewer productive assets appear to have done better 39 
 
in the RBD program than their wealthier counterparts, and the picture that is painted by the data 
is that this was accomplished by addressing disparities in fertilizer use and access to credit, 
which are the main pillars of RBD program.  
9  Conclusion 
This paper evaluated year one of the Rural Business Development program for small rice farmers 
in León, Nicaragua, a program co-funded by the US and Nicaraguan governments and 
administered by the Millennium Challenge Corporation. The RBD program delivers personalized 
extension services to small farmers, as well as credit in the form of inputs for rice production at a 
discounted price. The results of the analysis suggest that the program had no effects on 
participating households on average; this implies that the total benefits to its implementation 
were outweighed by the total costs. There is, however, some evidence that poorer households 
benefited more than their better off counterparts. During the 2008 – 2009 rice year León suffered 
an historically severe drought, which would likely undermine the impact of a program based 
partly on the proper and more intensive use of chemical fertilizers. The program appears to have 
partly shielded poorer farmers from the effects of drought through higher fertilizer use and 
enhanced access to credit.  
In addition to the benefits of the program to poorer farmers, participants in the RBD 
program may benefit on average over the long term due to extension advice received or better 
access to credit via their cooperatives.  However, if we were to account for costs, the net impact 
of the RBD program in year one of its existence would likely be negative. This underscores one 
danger of interventions designed to raise welfare among agricultural households in areas subject 
to large systemic shocks that cannot be perfectly predicted before planting decisions are made. 
These sorts of shocks are likely the most difficult to insure. Households participated in the RBD 40 
 
program voluntarily, and are likely aware of the risks posed by El Niño. But adding stronger risk 
management components to extension programs, whether they be insurance products, extension 
advice tailored to minimize the impact of shocks (e.g., water management in the case of rice), 
might encourage broader participation in such programs and increase their benefits overall.    41 
 
Appendix: Derivation of spatial HAC matrix 
Recall that the objective function for the weighted least squares regression is: 
  ( ) ( ) [ ]
2
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¢ ¢   + - -   ∑ i i w π z α   (A.18) 
The vector of estimated coefficients for the regression model, ˆ, α is found by solving a( ) 1 p´
vector of first order conditions, each element of which takes the following form: 
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1
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where , i p z is the p
th element of . i z Stacking these first order conditions yields: 
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¢   = + -   ∑ i π w π  A Taylor expansion of (A.19) around the probability 
limit of ˆ α, which we will label , α yields: 
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Rearranging and multiplying by N gives us: 
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To estimate the asymptotic variance of ˆ, α we need to first find the limiting distribution of 
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assuming the former is non-singular and its bracketed term obeys a law of large numbers. If










¢ - ∑ i i π z z α obeys a central limit theorem,
10 then the asymptotic covariance matrix 
of ˆ αwill be 
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The middle term in brackets is the covariance matrix of the first order conditions for the 
regression objective function given in (A.19), evaluated at . α If these first order conditions 
depend asymptotically on the vector of logit coefficients , π then any estimating equation for this 
term must take this dependence into account. As shown by Wooldridge (2002), there will be no 
such dependence if the moment condition given in (A.20) behaves the same whether it is 
evaluated at ˆ πor its probability limit, . π In other words: 
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    ∑ ∑ i i i i π z z α π z z α   (A.24) 
If this condition were to hold, it would imply that we can ignore the fact that ˆ πis estimated. If the 
regression model is the correct one, then as mentioned earlier weighting the data will have no 
                                                 
10 In the case of spatial data, whether a central limit theorem and a law of large numbers will apply is not always 
clear cut; data are dependent in ways that differ from what is commonly encountered with time series data, for 
example. Jenish and Prucha (2009) provide conditions under which this will be the case. A key assumption is that 
dependence decreases with distance, which seems reasonable in the present context.  43 
 
effect on consistency of ˆ; α conditional on the weights and , z the expected value of[ ] ˆ i y ¢ - i z α will 
be zero. If the regression function is misspecified, however, this will not hold in general. 
  To correct for dependence between ˆ αand ˆ πwe take an exact Taylor expansion of the first 
term of the right hand side of (A.21) around the probability limit of ˆ : π  
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  (A.25) 
This is a( ) 1 p´ vector, with an element for each coefficient in . α  The second term of the bottom 
line consists of the( ) p j ´ matrix of derivatives of (A.20) with respect to each of the j elements 
of the vector of logit coefficients, multiplied by the( ) 1 j´ vector ( )
1/2 ˆ . N - π π  The vectorπ ɶ
consists of elements located somewhere between ˆ πand . π   
We cannot use the ( )
1/2 ˆ N - π π term in estimation, as substituting in ˆ πforπwould cause it 
to drop out. Instead, it can be replaced with an equivalent expression, following the same steps 
used to arrive at (A.22). This yields: 
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where i F is the matrix of second derivatives of the logit objective function, evaluated at a vector 
lying somewhere between ˆ πand . π The right hand side of (A.26) is substituted into (A.25), which 
is then is substituted into the asymptotic covariance matrix for ˆ αgiven in (A.23). The latter can 
now be rewritten as: 44 
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where i g is given by: 
 
( )[ ]























i i i i i
i
π z α z
w π
π z α z w F w
w π
ɶ
  (A.28) 
The ( ) ( ) ˆ i E w ¢ i i π z z terms in(A.27) are estimated using their sample counterparts. The middle term 
can be rewritten as: 
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If there were no dependence across observations, then the second term in (A.29) would be zero, 
and the remaining component could be estimated using the usual formula for a heteroscedasticity 
robust covariance matrix (White 1980). In the case of spatial correlation, both components must 
be estimated.  
Kelejian and Prucha (2007) offer a way forward. Applying their technique yields the 
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where ˆ πand ˆ αhave been substituted into ˆ i g in place of  , π , π ɶ and , α , i j d is the Euclidean distance 
between observations i and j, and
* d is the distance beyond which observations are assumed to be 
uncorrelated. Kelejian and Prucha showed that this is a consistent estimator in the context of a 
particular type of spatial regression model, while Kim and Sun (2010) generalized their proof of 
consistency to apply to linear and nonlinear estimators based on the solution to a set of moment 
conditions, such as in this essay. In the present essay, the maximum distance
* d is set large 
enough to allow for the main land parcel of a given household to be correlated with those of its 
nearest 1, 5, and 10 neighbors, depending on the specification.   
To guarantee that (A.30) is positive semi-definite, the function ( ) K  must satisfy the 
conditions given in Assumption 7 of Kim and Sun. The results presented in this paper are the 
result of using a Parzen kernel: 
  ( ) ( )
3 2
3
1 6 6 for 0 1 2
2 1 for 1 2 1
0 otherwise
x x x
K x x x
  - + £ <
    = - £ <  
 
   
  (A.31) 
Inference is then conducted by carrying out via a bootstrapped asymptotic refinement. This 
consists of the following steps: 
1.  Estimate the model on the full sample. 
2.  Compute t-statistics for the weighted least squares regression coefficients. 
3.  Draw a random sample with replacement from the full sample. 
4.  Estimate  ˆ, π ˆ, α and (A.30) using the bootstrapped sample.  46 
 
5.  Compute t-statistics for the regression coefficients centered on the coefficient estimates 
from step 1.  
The estimated distributions of the t-statistics for the model parameters are constructed by 
repeating steps 1 through 3, and statistical significance is determined by seeing where the t-
statistics computed using the full sample lie in the bootstrapped distribution. The bootstrapped 
procedure will not preserve the spatial correlation of the full sample, but Kim and Sun present 
simulation results showing that it improves the accuracy of confidence intervals over the usual 
symmetric normal approximation.  
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